Sunday, December 16, 2007

Myths on Iraq

VDH dispels the common myths about Iraq:

“Iraq is the worst (fill in the blanks) in American history.”

Critics are not allowed to stop history at a convenient point — at Abu Ghraib, the pull-back from Fallujah, or the bombing of the dome at Samara — and then pass final judgment whenever they wish. If Lincoln had quit after Cold Harbor, Wilson after the German Spring offensive of 1918, or Roosevelt after the fall of the Philippines, then their presidencies would have failed and the U.S. today would be a far weaker — or perhaps nonexistent — country.

History instead will assess Iraq when it ends — either in defeat through a precipitous American withdrawal and collapse of Iraq, or in victory after a gradual redeployment of American troops as Iraqi forces step in to ensure the stability and security of a constitutional state.

We don’t yet know the verdict on the American investment in the war, since its aggregate costs and its aftermath are obviously not yet over. But already we sense that the worst thing our enemies — al Qaeda, Iran, Libya, or Syria — feared was the establishment of a constitutional government in place of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the accompanying principle that autocratic governments of the region cannot acquire dangerous arsenals to support terror and to bully their neighbors.

That we haven’t had another September 11th, while bin Laden’s popularity has plummeted in the Islamic Middle East — if both trends continue — will factor positively in any analysis. Again, how much blood and treasure were worth the thwarting of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein in a post-9/11 landscape won’t be adjudicated for years to come. But we should remember that such an assessment won’t hinge on the difference between war and peace per se, but rather between having the Taliban and Saddam Hussein in power, and the costs and benefits of getting them out and replacing them with something far better.

In conclusion, we do know of one assertion about Iraq that really is true. The conventional wisdom of pundits, reporters, and politicians is predicated on their own daily perceptions of whether we are winning or losing the war — and thus what they say is true today they may well say is not tomorrow.
It's a good article. If you have time, read the whole thing.

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